In the fall of 2013, professional photography was dominated by two giants: Canon and Nikon. Walk into any wedding venue, sports arena, or photography studio, and you'd see walls of black cameras adorned with distinctive red rings and gold badges. The Canon 5D Mark III and Nikon D800 weren't just cameras—they were symbols of serious professional work, with their substantial weight, distinctive mirror slap sound, and undisputed market authority.
Then Sony changed everything. On October 16, 2013, the company announced the a7 and a7R, the world's first full-frame mirrorless cameras with autofocus and electronic viewfinders. Compared to the dominant DSLRs, these cameras looked almost toy-like in their compact size. The photography establishment, particularly Canon and Nikon executives, dismissed them as an interesting experiment rather than a serious threat to their decades-long dominance.
This dismissal would prove to be one of the most costly miscalculations in photography history. It took five years for Canon and Nikon to recognize they weren't watching a cute gadget—they were witnessing their entire business model become obsolete. By the time they scrambled to respond in 2018, Sony had built such a commanding lead that the two traditional giants are only now beginning to reclaim lost ground.
To understand the magnitude of Sony's disruption, it's crucial to grasp just how completely Canon and Nikon controlled professional photography in 2013. Together, they commanded roughly three-quarters of the interchangeable-lens camera market, with an even higher percentage among working professionals. Their supremacy was built on decades of lens development, extensive marketing, and powerful ecosystem lock-in effects that made switching brands extremely costly.
This dominance extended far beyond camera bodies. Both companies had created comprehensive systems encompassing lenses, flashes, accessories, service centers, and most importantly, network effects. Sports photographers used Canon because Sports Illustrated photographers used Canon. Wedding photographers chose Nikon because their mentors used Nikon. The entire professional photography industry had crystallized around these two brands, creating what seemed like unbreakable market positions.
Both Canon and Nikon had experimented with mirrorless technology before Sony's breakthrough. Canon launched the EOS M in 2012, while Nikon introduced the Nikon 1 series. However, tellingly, both systems used smaller sensors—APS-C for Canon and an even tinier 1-inch sensor for Nikon. The message was unmistakable: mirrorless technology was for consumers, tourists, and hobbyists, not serious professionals who needed substantial, reliable DSLR cameras.
What Canon and Nikon failed to recognize was that Sony's a7 wasn't a sudden gamble—it was the culmination of years of strategic preparation. In 2006, Sony acquired Konica Minolta's entire camera division, gaining decades of optical expertise and the foundation for their A-mount system. While competitors dismissed this as Sony buying their way into a market they didn't understand, the company was actually building the foundation for something revolutionary.
By 2010, Sony was experimenting with SLT (Single-Lens Translucent) cameras like the a77, and later the full-frame a99 in 2012. These cameras used fixed, translucent mirrors instead of flipping mirrors, enabling full-time phase-detect autofocus during video recording and high-resolution electronic viewfinders. Sony was perfecting the EVF experience and approaching imaging computationally while Canon and Nikon remained committed to traditional optical viewfinders.
Simultaneously, Sony launched their APS-C mirrorless NEX system in 2010, built around the E-mount that would eventually support full-frame sensors. For three years before the a7's announcement, Sony was testing the market, refining user experience, and building their mirrorless ecosystem. The a7 wasn't a shot in the dark—it was the calculated fusion of their full-frame sensor technology from the A-mount line with their proven mirrorless E-mount system from NEX.
Sony possessed a crucial advantage that Canon and Nikon couldn't match: they weren't just a camera manufacturer but the world's leading image sensor supplier. Many of Nikon's best DSLRs actually used Sony sensors. This vertical integration provided Sony with research and development advantages that their competitors simply couldn't replicate.
When Sony unveiled the a7 and a7R at a press event in Tokyo, the specifications seemed almost impossible. They had packed a full-frame sensor—the same size as a 5D Mark III or D800—into a body weighing just 474 grams without a lens. That was less than half the weight of Canon's flagship camera, so compact it could nearly disappear in a jacket pocket.
But Sony wasn't merely miniaturizing existing technology—they were fundamentally rethinking camera design. The key innovation was Sony's E-mount with its remarkably short 18mm flange distance, compared to 44mm for Canon's EF mount and 46.5mm for Nikon's F mount. This seemingly technical detail was actually the secret weapon that would crack open the entire industry.
Canon and Nikon's mounts were designed decades earlier when cameras required space for mirrors to flip up and down during operation. These mirrors were essential for optical viewfinders, but they also meant lenses had to be mounted far from the sensor—a distance locked in forever by the mount design. Sony's mirrorless design eliminated the mirror entirely, allowing lenses to sit much closer to the sensor.
This created a game-changing advantage: while you cannot mount a short-flange lens on a long-flange camera, you can absolutely mount a long-flange lens on a short-flange camera using simple adapters. Suddenly, with adapters like Metabones, photographers could mount their entire collections of Canon L-series or Nikon glass on Sony bodies with functional autofocus. Vintage Leica lenses from the 1950s worked perfectly, as did expensive Zeiss glass previously limited to specific camera systems.
Sony had accomplished something remarkable: they built a professional camera system that didn't require decades of lens development because it could simply utilize everyone else's decades of lens development. Investment in Canon or Nikon glass was no longer a reason to stay with those brands—it became a reason to try Sony.
The adapter compatibility was just the beginning. The a7 featured an electronic viewfinder that displayed the final exposure before taking the shot, eliminating the need to review LCD screens after each frame to check exposure accuracy. Sony also brought their deep expertise in video and broadcast imaging, developed through decades of making Handycams, XDCAM cameras, and CineAlta cinema cameras, directly into the a7 line. While Canon and Nikon built refined optical instruments with electronic components, Sony was building computers that happened to take photographs.
In Canon and Nikon boardrooms, the a7 wasn't perceived as a threat but as validation of their own strategy. Sony had attempted to build a "professional" camera but had to make it tiny because they couldn't compete with real professional bodies, they reasoned. Professional photographers needed the battery life that only large bodies could provide, the ergonomics and durability of weather-sealed DSLRs that could withstand punishment. Nobody would abandon their investments in Canon L-glass or Nikkors to buy into an unproven system with limited native lens options.
This dismissal rested on three fundamental assumptions that seemed unshakeable. First, they believed size was a feature, not a limitation. Both companies had spent decades marketing the idea that professional cameras should be substantial, with grips that filled your hand and weight that conveyed quality. They completely missed that professional photographers didn't actually enjoy carrying 15 pounds of gear during six-hour wedding shoots or dealing with back pain from hiking with dual-body setups—they tolerated the weight because they had no alternative.
Second, they believed their lens ecosystems created unbreakable competitive moats. Canon had over 70 EF lenses, Nikon had over 90 F-mount lenses, and photographers had invested tens of thousands of dollars in glass. The conventional wisdom held that these switching costs were overwhelming—nobody would abandon their lens collections to start over with a new system.
Third, they were protecting legacy businesses, particularly Canon with their successful Cinema EOS line of expensive video cameras for professional filmmakers. They had deliberately limited the video capabilities of their DSLRs to avoid cannibalizing high-margin cinema camera sales. The 5D Mark III could shoot beautiful video but had recording time limits and overheating issues that Canon's engineers could easily have resolved. Sony had no such legacy to protect and could integrate their best video technology into the a7 without worrying about damaging other product lines.
For five years, from 2013 to 2018, Sony had the entire full-frame mirrorless market to themselves—not because the market was small, but because Canon and Nikon had decided it didn't exist. Sony didn't waste this unprecedented opportunity, iterating relentlessly and building their ecosystem. In 2014, they released the a7 II, bringing 5-axis in-body stabilization to full-frame for the first time, effectively stabilizing every lens you owned, whether adapted or native.
The innovations continued with 2015's a7R II featuring a groundbreaking 42-megapixel sensor and improved autofocus, followed by 2017's a7R III that maintained the 42MP resolution while adding dual card slots, dramatically better battery life, faster autofocus, and improved ergonomics. While Sony's early lens lineup faced criticism for being soft, slow, and expensive, the 2016 launch of their G Master series, starting with the 85mm f/1.4 GM, closed the quality gap substantially. Third-party manufacturers like Sigma, Tamron, and Zeiss, recognizing market trends, committed to the E-mount with their own high-quality lens lineups.
Meanwhile, Canon and Nikon continued perfecting DSLR technology. Nikon's 2017 release of the D850, widely considered the greatest DSLR ever made, won countless "camera of the year" awards even over Sony's mirrorless offerings. The D850's success likely reinforced Nikon's belief that DSLRs had a long future and that professionals would remain loyal to the "best" optical-based systems. They were perfecting mirrors and pentaprisms while Sony was eliminating them entirely.
The most significant release came in February 2018 with the Sony a7 III. If the original a7 was proof of concept, the a7 III was the refined execution that would become the default choice for a generation of photographers. The camera was spectacular, featuring 693 phase-detection autofocus points covering 93% of the frame, Eye-AF that could track subjects' eyes even when they turned their heads, 10fps burst shooting with continuous AF tracking, dual SD card slots, and oversampled 4K video from the full sensor width.
At a launch price of just $2,000 body-only, the a7 III undercut Canon's 5D Mark IV by nearly $1,500. For working professionals, especially those doing hybrid photo and video work, the a7 III was revolutionary. You could shoot wedding ceremonies at 10fps with Eye-AF ensuring every frame was sharp, then immediately switch to 4K video for receptions. Sony wasn't just selling cameras anymore—they were selling a complete, mature system capable of handling any professional assignment.
Canon and Nikon finally responded in September 2018, with Canon announcing the EOS R system and Nikon unveiling the Z6 and Z7. Both were full-frame mirrorless cameras designed to compete directly with Sony. On paper, they appeared competitive—the EOS R had a 30-megapixel sensor with Canon's excellent color science, while the Z7 featured 45.7 megapixels and Nikon's legendary build quality. Both companies emphasized their new mounts (RF and Z respectively) that would enable better optical performance than their legendary DSLR lenses.
However, when reviewers and professionals actually tested these cameras, significant gaps became apparent. These weren't competitors to the a7 III, Sony's third-generation camera—they were competitors to the original 2013 a7. Canon and Nikon had spent five years watching Sony iterate and responded by building what Sony had created half a decade earlier.
The EOS R launched with only a single SD card slot, a dealbreaker for wedding photographers, event shooters, and anyone who couldn't risk losing files to card corruption—the a7 III had two. The EOS R's autofocus, while competent, couldn't match Sony's 693-point system or sophisticated Eye-AF. Most critically, the EOS R's 4K video had a severe 1.7x crop factor, turning wide-angle lenses into normal lenses and making the camera nearly unusable for serious video work.
Nikon's Z6 and Z7 were superior in some respects, with the Z7 featuring a particularly impressive sensor, but they too launched with single card slots and autofocus systems that felt a generation behind Sony's. More importantly, both companies launched their new systems with minimal lens lineups—the EOS R had just four native RF lenses, while the Z system launched with three. Both offered adapters for legacy DSLR lenses, but this was Sony's 2013 strategy executed five years later without the benefit of having spent that time developing native mirrorless glass.
The market response was decisive. The a7 III became one of the best-selling cameras of all time. Working professionals who had been waiting to see Canon and Nikon's response bought Sony cameras instead. YouTube filled with videos of Canon and Nikon shooters documenting their switches to Sony systems.
To their credit, Canon and Nikon learned quickly from their initial missteps. By 2020, Canon released the excellent R5 and R6, which addressed most of the EOS R's problems while adding impressive features like 8K video recording and dual card slots. Nikon followed with the Z6 II and Z7 II featuring dual card slots, then later the spectacular Z8 and Z9, proving they could build world-class mirrorless bodies that competed directly with Sony's flagship a1.
Today's mirrorless market features a brutal three-way competition. Canon's R5 Mark II, Nikon's Z9, and Sony's a1 are all phenomenal cameras that compete effectively across nearly every metric. Canon has been particularly aggressive, with recent market data showing they've caught up to and in some regions surpassed Sony in new full-frame mirrorless sales.
However, Canon and Nikon cannot recover those five formative years from 2013 to 2018. Sony used that time to build an ecosystem that remains the most comprehensive in full-frame mirrorless photography. They developed one of the most extensive native lens lineups, secured the strongest third-party support from manufacturers like Sigma and Tamron, and most importantly, won an entire generation of photographers who entered the professional market during those years and built their businesses on E-mount systems.
Rental companies like LensRentals report that Sony mirrorless gear remains among their most-requested cameras. In 2024, Sony tied with Canon on the company's top 20 most-rented list, with each brand occupying four spots. YouTube creators and Instagram photographers—the new generation of image-makers—still overwhelmingly choose Sony for their first professional camera systems. This demonstrates the lasting power of being first to market with a compelling product.
Canon and Nikon aren't disappearing. They're too large, too well-established, and their recent cameras are too exceptional for them to fail. But they lost something irreplaceable: five years during which third-party lens manufacturers built their strategies around E-mount, five years when the industry narrative shifted from "Sony is trying to compete" to "Canon and Nikon are trying to catch up."
The Sony a7 story extends beyond cameras to serve as a masterclass in disruption and the dangers of incumbent thinking. Sony understood that the camera market was undergoing fundamental transformation—not just moving from mirrors to mirrorless, but transitioning from optical instruments to computational photography, from single-purpose cameras to hybrid tools, from systems built on legacy technology to platforms designed for the future. Canon and Nikon were building better horse-drawn carriages while Sony was manufacturing automobiles.
The tragedy for Canon and Nikon is that they possessed every advantage: brand recognition, dealer networks, marketing budgets, and decades of optical expertise. Had they taken Sony seriously in 2013 and responded in 2014 or 2015, this story might have ended very differently. Instead, they waited, protected their legacy businesses, assumed customer loyalty would persist, and awakened in 2018 to discover the market had shifted beneath their feet.
Today, walking into professional photography studios reveals the lasting impact of Sony's revolution. While you'll still see plenty of Canon and Nikon equipment, you'll also notice many Sony cameras with distinctive orange GM lens rings. The sea of black, red, and gold has been joined by black and orange. Though Canon and Nikon have built excellent cameras that compete technically, they continue fighting to reclaim the cultural and ecosystem momentum Sony captured during those five critical years. That's the true cost of sleeping through a revolution—not necessarily losing the war, but spending a decade fighting to reclaim ground that should never have been lost in the first place.
